Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims

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Case: Hadley v. McGivern, No. 2025-CH-05527 (Cook County, Chancery Division) · Judge: Eve M. Reilly
Filed: January 2, 2026 · Decided: August 18, 2026

Ruling

The court GRANTED summary judgment (judgment without trial) for McGivern on Counts I and II, entered judgment on the counterclaims proven up, and ordered: “Judgment is entered for Defendant in the amount of $43,525 and this matter is disposed.”

The Motion (Defendant Brandon McGivern, pro se, January 2, 2026)

McGivern requested summary judgment on Count I (breach of contract) and Count II (quantum meruit, a claim for the value of a benefit conferred). He argued that Hadley repudiated any agreement through an October 9, 2024 text and a February 14, 2025 email, breached first by using condominium sale proceeds to buy a vehicle, and could not claim reliance as a licensed real estate agent aware that oral real estate agreements are unenforceable. He also argued that unclean hands (misconduct barring equitable relief) foreclosed Count II.

The Response (Plaintiff Kyle Hadley, May 15, 2025)

Hadley argued that the parties disputed the existence and terms of a 2022 verbal agreement to purchase the property for approximately $320,000, and the characterization of his $30,000 in payments. He argued his statements were not a definite and unequivocal refusal to perform, and that McGivern’s February 15, 2025 letter proposed revised purchase terms. He argued that unclean hands and the claimed offsets rested on disputed facts requiring a trier of fact, and submitted his own affidavit.

The Reply (Defendant Brandon McGivern, pro se, May 25, 2025)

McGivern argued the affidavit contradicted deemed admissions, which he asserted are conclusive under Bright v. Dicke, and was conclusory under Rule 191(a). He argued Hadley did not address the Statute of Frauds, the December 22, 2025 dismissal of Counts III and IV, or the default on the counterclaims.

The Court Order (Judge Reilly, August 18, 2026)

The court found that the deemed admissions and the default resolved many factual issues. It found Hadley had admitted repudiating the purchase contract, that improvements were unauthorized, and that unclean hands barred recovery on Count II. On the counterclaims, the court found damages proven of $1,195, $17,450, $23,580, and $1,300 in costs, and not proven on Counts III and IV.


Documents